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HUNTING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
David V. Snyder*

Abstract
This paper considers how promissory estoppel jobs are undertaken in two
jurisdictions that ought not to need promissory estoppel. The purpose is
to achieve a better understanding of systematic decisions to enforce
promises and to discover the doctrinal combinations possible in mixed
Civil Law / Common Law jurisdictions. This bilateral comparison allows
an examination of the different philosophical and moral bases for
according promises legal force, whether founded on contract and will or
on delict and injury. The differing functions of formalities are also
discussed. More particularly, Scotland does not have promissory estoppel
but has a remarkable doctrine allowing the enforceability even of
unilateral, gratuitous promises. In addition, the Scots law of personal
bar, which is similar to estoppel and waiver, fulfils other jobs associated
with promissory estoppel. Louisiana, on the other hand, long claimed to
reject promissory estoppel but then reversed course and adopted the
doctrine about twenty-five years ago. The comparison of these two legal
systems affords an opportunity to observe the doctrinal mixes and
philosophical choices that have long drawn comparative law scholars to
mixed jurisdictions. It also reveals the roles that promissory estoppel can
play and how it is not entirely tethered to the problems of the
consideration doctrine.

Promissory estoppel came into Louisiana law silently, as it pervaded the rest of the
United States, under the guises of other doctrines. Even after Williston discovered the
hidden current in the American case law and named it ‘promissory estoppel’ (to
distinguish it from equitable estoppel), the doctrine remained unacknowledged in
* Copyright © 2008 David V. Snyder, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington,
D.C. Thanks for research assistance go to Rémi Auba Bresson, Drew Cutler, Janette Hays, and Diana
Verm, and I am grateful as always to the amazingly resourceful Adeen Postar of the Pence Law Library,
and to the other fine professionals there, particularly Y. Renée Talley-Cuthbert. I would like to note my
special gratitude to Hector MacQueen and Elspeth Reid, my mentors in this project; Laura Macgregor, who
made a special effort to help me understand Scots law and its institutions; as well as to Vernon Palmer and
the other organizers and participants in the Louisiana-Scotland project, who provided more assistance than
can be catalogued here. Many errors no doubt remain, and they are mine alone.
In keeping with the editors’ injunction, I have endeavoured to minimize footnotes. In that effort I
have often relied on certain central sources that I try to acknowledge prominently but not repeatedly.
Readers should realize that this practice may depart from the usual expectations of American legal writing.
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Louisiana law. With its Civil Law heritage Louisiana had no need to fix Common Law
problems, it was thought, and promissory estoppel was only a tool for Common Law
repairs. This thinking turned, though, and the state has now enshrined promissory
estoppel in the Civil Code. The story is touched by drama, with misperception and
disguise, the arch of character development and retrenchment, changes of view and of
heart, and a conclusion gilded by triumph and tinged with ambiguity.
The drama in Louisiana law comes from the relationship of Common Law and
Civil Law in a hot, fecund setting. One may well hope that the cooler moisture of
Scotland, which has produced more than its share of drama amid the mix of romantic
settings and careful rationalists, would also produce an engrossing but different story of
legal mixture. In Scotland, even Adam Smith and David Hume interested themselves in
promises and their place in the law, and in Smith’s case, the Scots law in particular.1
With this background, the subject seemed an enticing prospect for an interesting story.
For this I have gone looking, and I now want to explain what I have found. As a study of
two mixed jurisdictions, the story told in this chapter, like in the rest of the book, is
necessarily an examination of a relationship between two sets of relationships. As might
be imagined, the stories make an intricate and complex braid.

A.

APOLOGIA FOR A DOCTRINAL STUDY OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

Promissory estoppel is marked by three characteristics that make it peculiarly interesting
for comparative study. Its father was the strict doctrine of consideration, and its mother
was the just pressure to decide cases fairly despite technical strictures. Its growing up was
shaped profoundly by the death of its old fashioned but generous grandparent the seal,
1

W W McBryde “Promises in Scots Law” (1993) 42 Intl&CompLQ 48 at 57-59.
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which honoured gratuitous promises but only so long as they were sufficiently cloaked in
formality. This ancestry, comprised of distinguishing doctrines of the Common Law and
the case method of legal development, would seem to destine promissory estoppel for a
life only within thoroughly Common Law systems. Yet its presence in Louisiana law
over many decades, and its spectacular introduction into the Civil Code in the late
twentieth century, would suggest that the power of the doctrine—long a source of
concern to scholars who thought it might just kill the whole of contract law—would
propel it into the worlds of mixed jurisdictions, at least, and perhaps the Civil Law itself.
Second, promissory estoppel is the closest that the Common Law comes to
recognizing the moral core of a promise. With the consideration doctrine, the Common
Law seems to hold that a promise in the eyes of the law is only worthwhile if someone
else is paying for it. Moreover, the worth of the promise is typically defined only in
monetary terms. While the latter point needs little rehearsal, in American scholarship it
has become sharpened by the literature that spins contracts into options either to perform
or to pay damages.2 How systems outside the relatively pure jurisdictions in England and
the United States treat unbargained-for promises may cast light on the presence or
absence of moral fibres running through the legal treatment of promises, and the strength
and orientation of those sometimes hidden threads. This chance for close observation
brings up the possibility of shedding more light on the familiar and related last point.
The moral implications of promise can be seen in two ways: the moral need for
the promisor to adhere to the promise, and the moral impetus to protect a promisee who
has been harmed by a broken promise. Put this way, the third point becomes apparent, as
promissory estoppel can be conceived more as a doctrine of tort than of contract. Framed
2

See, e.g., A W Katz, “The Option Element in Contracting” (2004) 90 VaLRev 2187.
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in these terms the issue seems legal and technical, but stripped of its legal jargon the
question seeks a revelation about whom the law seeks to protect and what interests are
deemed worthy of legal protection. A close look, then, might reveal the moral warp and
woof of the law’s choices: the promisor’s duty, which is a consequence of his own
freedom and the dignity of his will, is woven through the promisee’s right, which is a
consequence of his injury, whether real, potential, or conceptual. There are few questions
more fundamental, and the law’s treatment of unbargained-for promises again would
seem an attractive path for research that would enable a better understanding of systemic
commitments in different jurisdictions.
Having these questions in mind, then, an excursion into the law of promises
would seem likely to be rewarding. At the same time, it must be admitted that the project
is unusual in its formulation. The centre of the inquiry is a doctrine, and this design
would seem to ignore the insights offered by Rudolf Schlesinger and the followers of the
Cornell method.3 This study, though, while now unorthodox in its doctrinal focus, does
not ignore their teachings. Promissory estoppel will remain at the centre, but the focus
will be on the kinds of ‘jobs’ that the doctrine is expected to do, and how those legal jobs
are undertaken in Louisiana and Scotland. The examination, of course, will take place in
a doctrinal light inevitably filtered through the omnipresences of American and English
Common Law, with which both of the smaller jurisdictions have to contend.
The greater project here, after all, is a bilateral comparison of two mixed
jurisdictions, and the mixed nature of the systems is a key component of the study. In this
regard, a fourth point can be added to the three characteristics of promissory estoppel

3

See generally R B Schlesinger (ed) Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal
Systems (1968).
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mentioned above: perhaps by happenstance, the Louisiana and Scottish law relating to
unbargained-for promises allows an extraordinary insight into the mixing of policies,
doctrines, and attitudes, along with the peculiar sources of law in these two mixed
jurisdictions. In Stair’s institutional analysis of promises and contracts, and in the
Louisiana State Law Institute’s careful debate on promissory estoppel, observers may
witness just the kind of mixing that imports select ingredients, alters them to suit local
taste, and lets the transformation of the import adapt and grow in a new environment.
This is what I have been hunting, and I believe that I have found it in the law of promises,
whether they be couched in terms of promissory estoppel and detrimental reliance or
unilateral obligations and personal bar.

B.

FUNDAMENTALS

This kind of study needs to be built from fundamentals, and the relation of promissory
estoppel to some of the basic tenets of legal systems—tenets like consideration, cause,
and promise—is part of the attraction of this inquiry. To understand each of these
relationships, the components in each system need to be established and evaluated. We
begin with the Common Law, especially the American law of promissory estoppel, but
with some reference to its English counterpart. With that foundation, the mixed
approaches in Louisiana and Scotland can be examined.

(1) Promissory estoppel in the United States and England
Promissory estoppel appears in its most important current formulation in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts (1981):
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§ 90. Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited
as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under
Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.
This provision in the second Restatement adds a few fillips to the influential introduction
of the doctrine in the first Restatement (1932). The essential features, though, remain.4 A
promise and detrimental reliance on it are both required, except in cases involving
charitable subscriptions (and the now rare marriage settlement), and the equitable and
exceptional nature of the rule appears expressly. Presumably the periphrastic negative
phrasing of the requirement of injustice is meant to emphasize that promissory estoppel is
a last resort.
The evolution of the doctrine is both interesting and important, but current
constraints require that it be told quickly and simply, perhaps overly so. Promissory
estoppel, as hinted before, is the child of the strict consideration doctrine. How
consideration came to be understood according to a rigid bargain theory is a curious
matter, but however it happened, the development was crystallized in the first
Restatement of Contracts. Consideration required a bargain, that is, that the parties
mutually induce each other with their promises or performances. At about the same time,
formal contracts ceased to matter as the seal became outmoded. Thus there could be no

4

Much of the information on the history of promissory estoppel in the United States and in Louisiana can
be found in more detail and with more elaborate citation in my earlier article, D V Snyder, “Comparative
Law in Action: Promissory Estoppel, the Civil Law, and the Mixed Jurisdiction” (1998) 15
ArizJIntl&CompL 695 (1998), reprinted in V V Palmer (ed) Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction
(1999) ch 10.
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consideration, and no enforceable contract, unless both parties were seeking the other’s
promise or performance.
So put, however, the results of countless cases could not be explained. In
recognition of this strong trend within the common law, which the reporter for the
Restatement had himself discovered, the honest Restatement recognized a doctrine of
promissory estoppel. To be enforceable, then, a promise would have to be part of a
contract supported by consideration (meaning a bargained-for exchange) or would have
to lie within the saving reach of the newly legitimized promissory estoppel. The sponsors
of the Restatement saw that the courts applying the common law would not be rigidly
constrained by an inflexible bargain theory, and promissory estoppel provided an escape
should the circumstances of a case prove sufficiently compelling.
The birth of promissory estoppel, of course, is only the beginning, and the
doctrine has grown. For a time some influential thinkers restricted it to use outside
business transactions, reasoning that in a commercial setting consideration should present
no difficulty, and the parties could protect themselves through contracts. ‘[I]t does not in
the end promote justice,’ the influential Learned Hand wrote, to protect ‘those who do not
protect themselves.’5 This restriction withered with the generation that propounded it,
though, and by the time of Justice Traynor, it had perished. The California Supreme
Court in Drennan v Star Paving Co.6 was perfectly willing to bring promissory estoppel
to the rescue of general contractors disappointed by the withdrawal of a subcontractor’s
bid—the very context in which Learned Hand had written his well known lines. No
longer confined to promises of family members and grateful employers, then, promissory

5
6

James Baird Co v Gimbel Bros 64 F2d 344 at 346 (2d Cir 1933).
333 P2d 757 (Cal 1958).
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estoppel seemed destined to displace consideration, which no one had loved much
anyway, and famous pronouncements of death predictably ensued.7
Consideration and the seal are not the only relevant doctrines. Just as the rigidities
of consideration could create pressure for escape, similarly rigid formal requirements
could do the same. Some contracts, to be enforceable, must be in writing under the
Statute of Frauds and its progeny, but sometimes strict adherence to writing requirements
seems to lead to injustice. Decisions confronting such facts led eventually to a number of
exceptions to the statute, but such situations also led some courts to allow a more general
residual escape based on promissory estoppel. This phenomenon received express
recognition in section 139 of the Second Restatement; it had not appeared in the first
Restatement,8 although the case law to support the idea was arguably present already.
After all, the formal requirements of the Statute of Frauds (1677) were stated with brittle
clarity far before the once-cloudy consideration doctrine hardened into the bargain form
and long before the American Common Law lost the seal.
Particularly because of its potential relevance to the Scottish side of this project,
promissory estoppel in England also deserves mention.9 The middle of the nineteenth
century witnessed the liberalization in various English doctrines of estoppel,10 but that
case law saw little use in the twentieth century until Lord Denning’s judgement in
Central London Property Trust Ltd. v High Trees House, Ltd.11 Later cases, including
prominent opinions from Lord Denning, developed the doctrine, although it retained its
7

Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974).
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 reporter’s note.
9
I have primarily followed Joel M. Ngugi “Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal
Transplant” (2007) 41 URichmondLRev 425 at 467, as my source on English law.
10
See particularly Hughes v Metropolitan Ry Co [1877] 2 AC 439 (HL), and Birmingham & Dist Land Co
v London & NW Ry Co 40 ChD 268 (CA 1888).
11
[1947] KB 130 at 135 (1946).
8
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roots in estoppel and thus could not ground a cause of action, being inherently a defence
to other obligations.12 Although this kind of estoppel, referred to occasionally by the
forthright ‘promissory estoppel’ label, is now well established,13 it remains tethered to its
defensive conception and is therefore often said to be a shield rather than a sword.14
English law arguably employs a less constricted doctrine of consideration than American
law, however, which may diminish the need for offensive promissory estoppel.15
Nevertheless, some suggest that under the influence of Australian law, which itself was
influenced by the American Restatements, English law may move toward an expanded
notion of promissory estoppel closer to American lines.16

(2) A historical introduction to promissory estoppel in Louisiana law
(a)

Cause and consideration in Louisiana law

Louisiana, it might be said dogmatically, has no doctrine of consideration, so one might
think that promissory estoppel would have no role in the state. The dogma, however, is
misleading, and it can be traced most clearly to sources other than the Civil Code for the
vast majority of the state’s legal history. The problem, indeed, was that the Civil Code
12

See Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 (CA).
See Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326 (PC).
14
See First Natl Bank PLC v Thompson [1996] Ch 231 (CA) (rejecting unitary approach to estoppel, which
would allow offensive use of the doctrine to protect promises); see also Republic of India v India S S Co
[1998] AC 878 at 914 (HL). Compare Amalgamated Inv & Prop Co v Texas Commerce Intl Bank Ltd
[1982] QB 84 at 122 (CA) (Denning MR) (Estoppel was ‘limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a
rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for
consideration, and so forth. All these can now [after 150 years of evolution] be seen to merge into one
general principle shorn of limitations.’). For the armorial analogy, see the opinion of Birkett LJ in Combe at
224.
15
See A T Denning “Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Consideration” (1952) 15 ModLRev 1 at 1-2.
16
The seminal Australian case is Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, and the
English courts have begun to cite it and its progeny, see Ngugi (n 9) at 492 & n 411. See generally ibid at
485-493. The expansiveness of proprietary estoppel can also seem to have considerable offensive capacity,
not far removed from American promissory estoppel. See e.g. Wayling v Jones 1995 FLR 1029; E C Reid
& J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) 95f. For a different viewpoint, see Roger Halson, “The Offensive
Limits of Promissory Estoppel” [1999] Lloyd’sMar&CommlLQ 256.
13
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itself contained the problematic word consideration, both in the central definition of
cause and in other troublesome places.
Nowhere was worse, obviously, than in the main definition of cause. ‘By the
cause of the contract,’ the Civil Code of 1870 provided, ‘is meant the consideration or
motive for making it.’17 The Civil Code of 1825 was the source for the 1870 provision,
and the 1825 French version gave this definition: ‘On entend par la cause du contrat . . .
la considération ou le motif qui a engagé à contracter.’18 If this were not enough,
consideration received another explicit mention in the Code just where it creates some of
its most obstreperous problems in the Common Law: with respect to options. (Note that
the minor differences between options and irrevocable offers are ignored in this chapter,
and both are referred to as options.) From the early twentieth century until 1985, the
relevant articles read, ‘One may purchase the right, or option to accept or reject, within a
stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell, after the purchase of such option, for any
consideration therein stipulated, such offer, or promise can not be withdrawn before the
time agreed upon . . . .’19
All of this fomented a fair amount of Civilian angst in Louisiana, proud of its
Civil Law heritage but having to cope with its location in a Common Law country.
Efforts nevertheless were made to reconcile these mentions of consideration with the
indisputably Civilian notion of cause. In general, Professor Litvinoff sought to show,

17

La Civ Code art 1896 (1870).
See art 1887 of the Civil Code of 1825. Where the Code of 1825 is the source, the French version is
considered more authoritative than the English versions of either 1825 or 1870. E.g. Ross v La Coste de
Monterville 502 So2d 1026 at 1029-30 (La 1987) (citing, inter alia, Shelp v Natl Surety Corp., 333 F2d 431
(5th Cir 1964)).
19
The quoted text reflects amendments through 1920 to article 2462 of the Code of 1870. The problematic
introduction of consideration or ‘value’ seems to have occurred during amendments in 1910, see Acts 1910,
no. 249, and 1920, see Acts 1920, no. 27. See generally Joseph Dainow (ed), Compiled Edition of the Civil
Codes of Louisiana vol 2 (1972) 105-106.
18
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‘consideration’ as used in the Code could be read to be ‘at times synonymous with
“cause,” and other times with “onerous cause.”’20 He then argued that the requirement
that there be ‘any consideration’ for an option would be satisfied in virtually every
option, given that the parties are interested in buying or selling, particularly since the
flexible ‘any consideration therein stipulated’ formulation replaced the earlier, stricter
requirement that the option be ‘purchase[d] . . . for value.’21 These arguments, while
based on undoubted facts, suggested strenuous interpretation that was not the more
convincing for its heroism. And despite such scholarly arguments, Louisiana courts
unhesitatingly required that an option be supported by consideration, much as at
Common Law.22
At the same time, Louisiana did recognize certain kinds of conventional
obligations without any consideration at all, as long as formal requirements were met.
Although the American Common Law had lost an efficacious seal, Louisiana retained the
possibility of a valid gratuitous contract, that is, a promise of a donation. The English
version of the article included a defining reference to consideration (‘without any profit
or advantage, received or promised as a consideration for it’), but this was not entirely
faithful to the original French (‘sans aucun profit ni avantage stipulé en faveur de l’autre

20

Saúl Litivinoff, Obligations vol 2 (1975) s 107.
A fuller quotation of the 1910 version may be helpful: ‘One may purchase the right, or option, to accept
or reject, within a stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell. After the purchase of such option, for value,
such offer or promise can not be withdrawn before the time agreed upon . . . .’ Note that I do not mean to
imply that consideration came into Louisiana law only in the early twentieth century. It goes back at least to
the early nineteenth. See Heirs of Cole v Cole’s Exrs 7 Mart (ns) 414 (La 1830) (‘defendants denied the
consideration, and the court below being of opinion, that none had passed between the parties, gave
judgment’).
22
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co v Ruiz 367 So2d 79 (La Ct App 4th Cir 1979) (option invalidated as
nudum pactum); see also McCarthy v Magliola 331 So2d 89 (La Ct App 1st Cir 1976) (upholding option
after finding it supported by consideration). Older cases also so held. See, e.g., Glover v Abney 106 So 735
(La 1925) (option without consideration not binding); Moresi v Burleigh 127 So 624 (La 1930) (holding
$100 sufficient consideration); Davis v Bray 191 So2d 774 (La Ct App 2d Cir 1966) (same).
21
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partie’).23 In any event, the reference to consideration did not cause any difficulty in this
case, and Louisiana law recognized even a fully gratuitous contract as a donation inter
vivos. Two requirements had to be met. First, the intent had to be expressed in a so-called
authentic public act, that is, a writing ‘passed before a notary public and two witnesses.’24
Second, the promise had to be accepted.25 Louisiana here followed the French idea of
cause, classifying the obligation as gratuitous but still allowing it, with formal
requirements. This situation obtained at the same time as various mentions of
consideration in other contexts muddied the Louisiana waters on whether the courts
would follow the doctrine of cause exclusively or would revert to ideas of consideration.
The legal situation in Louisiana was decidedly mixed.
Cleanup occurred in the revision of the Civil Code that became effective in 1985,
reflecting the mid- to late-century Civilian renaissance that Louisiana had enjoyed, much
as Scotland did. References to consideration were excised, and consideration doctrine
was expelled in clear terms. After requiring cause and defining it, without reference to
consideration, the comment to the revision states: ‘Under this Article, “cause” is not
“consideration.”’26 With respect to options, the revision requires no consideration, and
the revision commentary states, with a certain amount of gumption, that the revision
‘does not change the law.’27 Anyone reading the new article on the irrevocability of
offers would not know of the consideration difficulties of three-quarters of a century. And
the reference to consideration in the article on gratuitous contracts was also removed,

23

The English text is the same in the Codes of 1825 (art 1766) and 1870 (art 1773). The French text comes
from the 1825 Code.
24
La Civ Code arts 1536, 1538. French law is similar, requiring a notarial act. See C civ art 931.
25
La Civ Code arts 1540-1543.
26
See ibid arts 1966 (requiring cause), 1967 (defining cause) & cmt (c).
27
See ibid art 1928 & cmt (a).
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without mention, with the usual comment that the revised article ‘does not change the
law.’28

(b)

Promissory estoppel in Louisiana

As in the Common Law states, promissory estoppel got its start in late nineteenth-century
case law in which the equities of the case seemed to require enforcement of a promise
that did not amount to the usual kind of contract. In Choppin v Labranche, the Louisiana
Supreme Court enforced a promise to leave in peace the remains of the plaintiff’s
ancestor.29 A number of cases also enforced promises on grounds that could be
rationalized under the terms of promissory estoppel. To be sure, the cases did not use the
‘promissory estoppel’ label; courts arrived at these results through a variety of devices
and could hardly be expected to use the name, which had not yet been invented. So in the
early Louisiana law, promissory estoppel percolated quietly through the cases, as
elsewhere in the country.
The more interesting development occurred in the 1950s, when the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered promissory estoppel in Ducote v Oden. By that time the
doctrine had not only a name but also a renowned imprimatur from the American Law
Institute. After repeating counsel’s argument, which sounded the very words of the
Restatement, the court remarked that ‘[s]uch a theory is unknown to our law’ and could
not be found in the all-important ‘provisions of the Civil Code.’30 The holding is not as
square as it might be: The court emphasized the weakness of the plaintiff’s allegation that

28

See ibid art 1910 & cmt (a).
20 So 681 at 682 (La 1896).
30
Ducote v Oden, 59 So2d 130 at 132 (La 1952).
29

SNYDER

HUNTING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

14

the promise took place in a ‘casual . . . conversation in the stages of discussion,’31 and
even courts which accept the doctrine would likely find that the elemental ‘promise’ had
not been shown. Nevertheless, for many years Ducote was taken as a rejection of the
Common Law doctrine, perhaps a case of an opinion coming to stand for a broader and
more certain holding than the court had originally intended.
Eventually, this position would be reversed by the Civil Code. The Louisiana
State Law Institute decided to include promissory estoppel in the 1984 revision, and in
particular, in the central definition of cause. How this shift occurred is crucial to the
present inquiry and will be examined in more detail below. For the moment, it is enough
to see the product of the Institute debates, which appears in the current Civil Code:
Art. 1967. Cause defined; detrimental reliance
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his
detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be
limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the
promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise made
without required formalities is not reasonable.
The revision comments say that Ducote ‘is thus overruled.’ Since the revision, dozens of
cases have applied or considered article 1967.

(3) Promise and personal bar in Scotland
The doctrinal landscape in Scotland shares certain core characteristics with Louisiana but
in some ways it is considerably different. The law of promise and of personal bar are the
doctrines most relevant to this inquiry. The law of promise is intriguing but slender. The
scope of personal bar, which in American terms seems like all of estoppel and waiver
31

Ibid at 131-132.
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rolled into one (although this perception oversimplifies matters), is vast.32 We begin with
a short look at both, starting with promise.

(a)

The Scots law of promise

Although promises are central to countless legal systems of obligations, the naked
promise, unadorned by consideration or even acceptance, is a special creature. Usually
welcomed into legal confines with about as much enthusiasm as other streakers,33
Scotland is a special case. For hundreds of years Scots law has recognized the binding
force of at least some promises, even though they are unaccepted by the beneficiary and
unsupported by consideration. Indeed, the lack of acceptance, or any need for it, is the
only way to distinguish a promise from a contract in Scots law, since there is no
requirement of consideration.34 The distinctive Scots law of promise, at least at first,
would seem to preclude any place for promissory estoppel or its analogues.35 One

32

See Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 16) at 54-69.
Robertson v HM Adv [2007] HCJAC 63 (the case of the naked rambler).
34
Unlike Louisiana, Scotland has not generated great doctrinal or theoretical confusion in this regard, but
consideration is not entirely irrelevant. Lord Caplan, for instance, declines to find a promise in Gordon v
East Kilbride Development Corp, 1995 SLT 62 at 64 (28 Nov 1990), partly because the lack of
consideration flowing to the alleged promisor makes a true obligatory promise too unlikely.
35
My principal sources on promise have been: W W McBryde, The Law of Contracts in Scotland 3d edn
(2007) ch 2, and as to proof by writ or oath, the first edition (1987) paras 2-42 to 2-47 and 27-20; McBryde
(n 1); W D H Sellar “Promise”, in K Reid & R Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law in Scotland:
Obligations vol 2 (2000) 252. I understand that McBryde is thought to be most authoritative, at least by
practitioners. See H L MacQueen & J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland 2d edn (2007) para 1.52, which
I have also consulted (primarily paras 2.54-2.63). A thorough theoretical discussion appears in Martin
Hogg, Obligations 2d edn (2006) ch 2. German readers will be interested in R Zimmermann & P Hellwege
“Belohnungsversprechen: ‘pollicitatio’, ‘promise’ oder ‘offer’?: Schottisches Recht vor dem Hintergrund
der europaischen Entwicklungen” 1998 ZfRV 133. My main source on personal bar is Reid & Blackie,
Personal Bar (n 16), and I have considered J Rankine, The Law of Personal Bar in Scotland (1921)
superseded. See also H L MacQueen & W D H Sellar “Scots Law: Ius quaesitum tertio, Promise and
Irrevocability”, in E J H Schrage (ed) Ius Quaesitum Tertio (2008) 357. While I have not had occasion to
rely on it for specific points, J P Dawson’s famous Gifts and Promises: Continental and American Law
Compared (1980) has helped shape my interest and approach. For a purely American approach to similar
problems in light of new scholarship, see M B Wessman “Recent Defenses of Consideration:
Commodification and Collaboration” 41 IndLRev 9 (2008) (arguing for enforcement of gratuitous promises
and criticizing the requirement of consideration and the new arguments in its support).
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significant wrinkle, however, bears mention at this stage: until 1995 gratuitous promises
had to be proved by writ or oath. So perhaps they were not so naked after all. Moreover,
particular kinds of commercial obligations might have to be constituted or proved
formally, such as cautionary obligations (i.e., contracts of suretyship).36 These formal
requirements would seem to beg for an antidote in appropriate cases.

(b)

Personal bar and allied doctrines

And so it was, at least to some degree, and so it is. Before 1995, two common law rules
sometimes rescued obligations suffering from formal defects in their constitution. If the
promisee, with the promisor’s knowledge, relied on the defective agreement as if it were
valid, then the promisor was bound as long as his conduct was ‘unequivocally referable
to the agreement.’37 This rule was called rei interventus and sounds quite similar to
promissory estoppel when promissory estoppel is used to cure defects arising from the
statute of frauds. A second rule, homologation, bound the promisor when he himself
showed that he accepted the defective contract as valid. It sounds similar to the American
and English rules on ratification.
Homologation and rei interventus were limited, however, to defects in the
constitution of the obligation and could not be used to remedy defects in proof. This
meant that some obligations, which did not legally exist without a writing, could
nonetheless be deemed to exist. Other obligations—including gratuitous promises—did
not require a writing for their constitution, but had to be proved by writ or oath. For that
reason, homologation and rei interventus could not save the distinctive Scottish promise

36
37

Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856 s 6.
Bell, Prin § 26.
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if it were not in writing or were not confessed under oath.38 This would seem to tie Scots
law to Louisiana law: both systems allow enforceable gratuitous promises, unlike the
Common Law, because no consideration is required. A formality, however, is necessary
(and, in the case of Louisiana, so is acceptance). Since the law in both places allows
promises unhampered by rules on consideration, promissory estoppel and analogous rules
like homologation and rei interventus might be thought unnecessary.
In another light, though, the state of affairs in Scotland seems surprising.
Homologation and rei interventus were recognized sometimes, after all. A person could
be deemed bound although he was not in fact obligated in the eyes of the law, provided
the elements of homologation or rei interventus were satisfied. Yet in the eyes of the law
he was released from a real and validly constituted obligation, simply for want of
adequate proof, even if the elements of homologation or rei interventus were satisfied.
This result is no less remarkable because it seems to flow from a technical distinction
between the constitution and the proof of an obligation.39
But the most prominent point here is that the rule in Scotland was not softened if
there had been detrimental reliance on the promise.40 This result might be explained
away, though, on two grounds. I am only aware of a few cases so holding, almost all of
which are old (1911 and 1928) or even antique (1771 and 1861). Views of the equities of

38

See Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 16) ch. 7, especially at 123-24. This statement appears true at least
if the promise were not ancillary to a contract susceptible of proof by parol. See McBryde, Contracts 1st
edn (1987) (n 35) at 25.
39
This distinction is not present in Louisiana. See La Civ Code art 1536 (donation must be in proper form
‘under penalty of nullity’), 1538 (donation ‘will not be valid’ without requisite form); see also Civil Code
of 1825, arts 1523 (‘sous peine de nullité’), 1525 (‘ne sera valable’).
40
Gray v Johnston 1928 SC 659; Smith v Oliver 1911 SC 103 (10 Nov 1910); Edmondston v Edmondston
(1861) 23 D 995; Millar v Tremamondo 1771 M 12, 395. The only recent case I know is from the Sheriff’s
Court. McEleveen v McQuillan’s Ex’x 1997 Sh Ct 46. On the matters of proof by writ or oath, I have relied
on A G Walker & N M L Walker, The Law of Evidence in Scotland (1964), most particularly s 130, but
also ch 11 in general, at 113-134.
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promises and reliance may have changed over periods that can best be measured in
centuries. Also, the more recent high court cases (1911 and 1928), as well as the sheriff’s
court case that is the sole decision in memory (1997), all concerned wills, and as Lord
President Dunedin observed in one of them, it would ‘be a most extraordinary result’ if
promises to make wills could be informal when wills themselves had to be written.41
Homologation and rei interventus were not the only tools at the disposal of the
courts. The memorably named doctrine of Melville Monument liability can also come to
the rescue.42 In the seminal case, Walker and his father were developing the New Town
of Edinburgh on Walker’s estate. Milne led a group of subscribers who planned to erect a
monument to Viscount Melville, and they entered the estate with Walker’s permission,
where they broke the land and undertook other preparations. They also interfered with
Walker’s plan for the development of the estate before deciding to put the monument in
St. Andrew Square, where it still stands. When Walker sued, Milne objected that the
contract involved heritage (rights in land) and was invalid because it was unwritten. The
court nevertheless allowed Walker to recover any expenditure he had wasted on account
of the relocation of the monument.
Melville Monument liability looks very much like promissory estoppel, especially
on the facts of Walker v Milne. One of the long-time jobs of the doctrine was to solve
problems caused by writing requirements, which were precisely the problem in Walker.
The facts of the case highlight two other points as well. First, the case is not about a
promise but about an invalid contract, a result of the parties having proceeded by mutual
agreement as opposed to unilateral declaration. This semantic nicety does not distinguish
41

Smith v Oliver 1910 2 SLT 304 at 306, 1911 SC 103 at 111.
Walker v Milne (1823) 2 S 379 (new ed 338). See generally MacQueen & Thomson, Contracts (n 35)
paras 2.93-2.96.
42
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it from American promissory estoppel, however, but merely reflects a different usage.
Scots law limits promise to unilateral obligation, while American law often speaks of
contractual agreements in terms of (reciprocal) promises. Certainly many promissory
estoppel cases involve apparent agreements rather than simple and pure unilateral
declarations.
Second, the facts suggest charity or gratuity. It may well be that the agreement
could be characterized as being supported by consideration, or as an onerous and
synallagmatic contract. Perhaps Walker wanted to grace the New Town development
with an attractive monument to Lord Melville, and maybe thought it would add value to
the venture. Milne and the subscribers certainly wanted a place to put the monument, and
perhaps the parties agreed to a bargain based on those desires. But the erection of a
monument supported by subscriptions and Walker’s dedication of land without monetary
payment indicate that this undertaking was essentially eleemosynary. This fact-situation
is a second way in which Melville Monument liability, in the defining case, could be seen
as a kind of promissory estoppel.
While Walker v Milne was followed in the nineteenth century, current judicial
attitudes seem anxious to keep the liability exceptional, and ‘any tendency to extend the
scope of the remedy is to be discouraged.’43 In retrospect, this sceptical judicial view can
be detected early, as in Gray v Johnston, where the majority sees Melville Monument
liability subsisting in the cold shadow of the defective contract,44 and where the only
sympathetic treatment comes in Lord Justice Clerk Alness’s dissent.45 So any such
liability should be limited, recent authority holds, to situations where the promisor has at
43

Dawson Intl plc v Coats Patons plc, 1988 SLT 854 at 865 affd 1989 SLT 655.
1928 SLT 499 at 505 per Lord Ormidale.
45
See ibid at 508.
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least impliedly assured the other party that there is a binding contract.46 If the parties are
still negotiating, then, they are immune from Melville Monument liability. The potential
for Melville Monument liability remains as a saving doctrine for defective contracts,
though, and it may be conceived as a branch of personal bar.47 Whether it will become a
powerful tool for redress of defective contracts or will instead be confined to the rare
evocative case is an open question, but the latter at this point seems more likely.48
Recent scholarly work has done much to rationalize the law of personal bar,
which provides a largely defensive remedy for inconsistent conduct that causes
unfairness. It is summarized in the following schema by Elspeth Reid and John Blackie:
(A) INCONSISTENCY
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)

A person claims to have a right, the exercise of which the obligant
alleges is barred.
To the obligant’s knowledge, the rightholder behaved in a way which is
inconsistent with the exercise of the right. Inconsistency may take the
form of words, actions, or inaction.
At the time of so behaving the rightholder knew about the right.
Nonetheless the rightholder now seeks to exercise the right.
Its exercise will affect the obligant.

(B) UNFAIRNESS
In the light of the rightholder’s inconsistent conduct, it would be unfair if the
right were now to be exercised. Any of the following is an indicator of
unfairness:
(1) The rightholder’s conduct was blameworthy.
(2) The obligant reasonably believed that the right would not be exercised.
(3) As a result of that belief the obligant acted, or omitted to act, in a way
which is proportionate.

46

See Dawson 1988 SLT at 862-65.
See Gray v Johnston 1928 SC 659 at 676 (Alness LJC dissenting); Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 16)
at 96 n 82; see also John Blackie, “Good Faith and the Doctrine of Personal Bar”, in A D M Forte (ed)
Good Faith in Contract and Property (1999) 129 at 153-55 (noting that personal bar is generally only a
shield from liability while the Melville Monument theory is not so limited, suggesting that it is perhaps
closer to promissory estoppel than to personal bar).
48
Since Dawson, the doctrine has made only token reappearances, as in Bank of Scotland v 3i Plc 1990 SC
215 and in McMillan v Ghaly, unreported, Dundee Sh Ct, 9 Sept 2002.
47
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The exercise of the right would cause prejudice to the obligant which
would not have occurred but for the inconsistent conduct.
The value of the right barred is proportionate to the inconsistency.49

It may fairly be observed at this point that if Scotland did observe some kind of
promissory estoppel, it would fall reasonably neatly within this schema, with one possible
exception.
The main difficulty is point (A)(3), which suggests that the promisor must know
that his promise is not legally binding before he will be held estopped from shrinking
back from his promise. To the extent legal knowledge is a strict requirement, it could
differentiate personal bar from promissory estoppel as a matter of principle. Scottish
cases, old and new, do seem to treat legal knowledge as fundamental, holding that ‘no
man can be barred from the assertion of a legal right by acts done in ignorance of his
legal rights.’50 I know of no promissory estoppel cases in which the court even inquires
into this point, which would suggest that the issue is immaterial. On the other hand, the
Scots requirement of legal knowledge seems generally to be presumed, and the
presumption is strengthened by the rule, subject to exception, that ignorance of the law is
not a good rejoinder to a plea of personal bar.51 I am thus unsure to what degree this
requirement distinguishes personal bar from promissory estoppel in a way that would
make a difference in many decided cases, and this scepticism is reinforced by the advent
of statutory bar under the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, which omits any
knowledge requirement.52

49

See ibid at 30.
Lauder v Millars (1859) 21 D 1353 at 1357 per Inglis LJC; see also Porteous’ Trs v Porteous 1991 SLT
129; Strathclyde Regional Council v Persimmon Homes (Scotland) Ltd, 1996 SLT 176.
51
See Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 16) at 41-42.
52
See Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 1; Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 16) para 2-34.
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As a general matter, the Act gives many of the ideas of personal bar, and thus of
promissory estoppel, statutory form insofar as they provide an exception to formal
requirements. This result may be seen by considering the (simplified) facts of Smith v
Oliver under the 1995 Act, assuming the church could show reliance on the parishioner’s
promise to pay for the new roof: the promise would likely have been enforceable.53 The
statute would seem to give these principles greater authority and clarity than could be
achieved through sporadic development through common law; at the same time, statutory
status could lead the courts to stricter application of particular language instead of
judicious moulding of general principle. The statute eschews the vague ‘promise’ in
favour of ‘unilateral obligation.’ The usual rule, the Act provides, is that ‘the constitution
of a contract, unilateral obligation or trust’ need not be in writing. It then sets out
exceptions, including the expected provisions about land and also ‘a gratuitous unilateral
obligation except an obligation undertaken in the course of business.’
At least four moves happen in these provisions. They abolish any requirement that
promises be proved by writ or oath. They instead require a writing. They clarify that the
formal requirement applies only to gratuitous promises outside a business context, not to
any promises in the course of business and not to non-gratuitous promises outside the
business context. (It may be doubted whether a unilateral obligation can be anything but
gratuitous, as there is ‘no counterpart obligation,’54 or even acceptance. If the promise is
made in recognition of a natural or moral obligation, or is meant to repay a past debt, it
might not best be characterized as gratuitous, however: donative intent—animus
53

M Hogg & H MacQueen, “Donation in Scots Law”, in M Schmidt-Kaessel (ed) Donation in Europe
(forthcoming) at 9.
54
H L MacQueen “Constitution and Proof of Gratuitous Obligations: A Comment on Scottish Law
Commission Memorandum No. 66” 1986 SLT 1 at 2 (10 Jan 1986), sets forth his view that all promises are
gratuitous essentially for this reason.
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donandi—is lacking. The promisor may instead intend to fulfil and discharge an
obligation, imperfect though it may be.55) Most importantly for present purposes, the
statute provides that the promise be constituted, not merely proved, in writing. This last
move opens the way for exceptions to formal requirements based on the principles
underlying homologation and rei interventus.
The modern statute, of course, would not leave those two common law rules in
place, and it abolishes them expressly and substitutes its own formula. To simplify, where
one party has materially relied, the other party may not withdraw if doing so would result
in material harm. The lack of formality is forgiven. Although the statutory language is
lengthy and convoluted, this Scottish statute essentially states the principle of promissory
estoppel as applied to problems posed by the statute of frauds—a principle stated
explicitly in § 139 of the Second Restatement of Contracts. Here the point that may need
qualification is that the 1995 Act requires that the reliance take place with the promisor’s
‘knowledge and acquiescence.’ What is meant by these words is less than clear.
Professors MacQueen and Thomson suggest that actual knowledge is necessary, although
acquiescence is likely to be presumed.56 But we may still wonder: is the requirement

55

Cf La Civ Code arts 1523-1526 (so-called donations that are sufficiently remunerative are not treated as
donations), and on remuneratory donations in Scots law, see W M Gordon, “Donation”, in The Laws of
Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 8 (1992) para 608. Note that an imperfect obligation, while
not binding in a legal tribunal, is nevertheless binding in foro conscientiæ, as Stair knew, see Inst I.10.4.
Professor McBryde, noting that many promises occur in a commercial context, also holds that ‘not all
promises are gratuitous.’ McBryde (n 1) at 48. This conclusion may be bolstered by the positive
presumption, ancient and modern, against donations. ‘It is a rule in law, donation non præsumitur; and
therefore, whatsoever is done, if it can receive any other construction than donation, it is constructed
accordingly.’ Stair, Inst I.8.2. See also infra note 187 (commercial payment adjustments that are neither
donative nor onerous or synallagmatic). The difference of opinion noted here, seems of course to centre on
what is meant by gratuitous, a seemingly fine point that might have broad implications for the basis of legal
obligation. The issue, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper. For further discussion, see Hogg
& MacQueen (n 53); Martin Hogg, Obligations (n 35) paras 2.06-2.11.
56
MacQueen & Thomson, Contracts (n 35) para 2.49.
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satisfied if the reliance is foreseeable,57 perhaps even expected and desired,58 but the
promisor has not been informed that it has actually taken place? There may be some work
for the courts here, and it will be informative to observe the judicial reactions and
whether the old stance on knowledge under rei interventus doctrine is continued.59
Certainly the promisor’s knowledge and acquiescence would always be relevant to
promissory estoppel, if for no other reason than the relevance of injustice.60
The clarity that might be expected of a modern statutory codification of bar with
respect to formalities, however, is arguably illusory in the case of the 1995 Act. Certainly
the drafting is infelicitous, as Professors MacQueen and Thomson charitably put it, and
its circumlocution raises a number of technical questions of statutory interpretation that
could make a real difference in the results of cases.61 Although interesting, these
questions do not raise points of particular comparative importance, so they will be
ignored here. In addition, while the abolition of recourse to oath raises a matter of
comparative interest, promissory estoppel is only remotely relevant to the issue, if at all.62
Again, the issue is excluded here.
Finally, the Act applies its reliance principles to variations, thus bringing this
analogue of promissory estoppel into interestingly familiar territory. Contract
modifications have traditionally raised the very two problems in the Common Law that
promissory estoppel has characteristically attacked. Because of the pre-existing duty
rule—a corollary of the bargain theory of consideration—modifications often lack
57

As in the formulation in Restatement (Second) of Contracts s 90.
As in the classic promissory estoppel cases like Ricketts v Scothorn 77 NW 365 (Neb 1898), and Greiner
v Greiner 293 P 759 (Kan 1930).
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For the pre-statutory standard, see Danish Dairy Co v Gillespie, 1922 SC 656.
60
The principle is most familiar from the land cases like Greiner and is encapsulated in Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 129 (reliance on ‘continuing assent’).
61
MacQueen & Thomson, Contracts (n 35) paras 2.47-2.53.
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Cf UCC § 2-201(3).
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consideration and may be deprived of force for that reason. In addition, not only may the
usual requirements of the statute of frauds fell the modification, but the parties may add
their own statute of frauds by requiring that all contract modifications be in writing.
Although these ‘no oral modification’ clauses were invalid at American Common Law,
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code validates them, but subjects them to an
exception based on the ideas of estoppel.63 The 1995 Act thus aligns itself with American
notions of promissory estoppel, although these notions are more salient in American law
generally than in Louisiana in particular.

C.

MIXING BOWLS

It may well be asked how Louisiana and Scotland got to where they are on these
questions, and an attempt at an answer is an informative exercise. One of the great
attractions of writing about promises in Louisiana and Scotland is the chance to observe
the doctrinal mixing take place. The work in Louisiana is relatively recent—it concluded
about twenty-five years ago—and the drafts of proposals and minutes of meetings are
available. The relevant work in Scotland occurred centuries ago, but careful historical
research and rigorous doctrinal analysis have revealed how the mixture took place. The
current study provides an opportunity to put that work together and to compare it. In both
places even a casual observer can see how ingredients are imported, trimmed, sliced, and
mixed with local produce. Proceeding chronologically, we begin with Scotland.

(1)

63

Stair, Europe, the centuries, and the smoke ball

See UCC § 2-209. See generally D V Snyder, “The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public
and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel” 1999 WisLRev 607.
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The remarkable law of Scotland on promises has excited considerable interest at least
since T. B. Smith brought attention to it in the middle twentieth century, and its career
since then has been no less remarkable, now being taken into the Principles of European
Contract Law and the Draft Common Frame of Reference.64 As is seemingly true of all
good stories in Scots law, the seventeenth-century studies of Stair are the starting place,
although admittedly the account here is simplified, even as Stair himself offered a
simplified analysis of a complex dispute within the civil law, canon law, and the ius
commune.65
Stair treats promises in his title, ‘Obligations Conventional, by Promise, Paction,
and Contract.’ In his scheme, the promise leads to an obligation, which is a restriction on
the liberty that he regards as a man’s starting point. These obligations restrict our liberty
because of ‘our will and consent,’ and so in modern terms they might be denominated
consensual obligations.66 One of the most unusual features of the Scots law of promise is
that no agreement or coming together is required (so they are not conventional). The
exercise of the will results in an ‘engagement [that] is a diminution of freedom,
constituting that power in another, whereby he may restrain, or constrain us to the doing
or performing of that whereof we have given him power of exaction.’ So Stair introduces
his subject.

64

‘A promise which is intended to be legally binding without acceptance is binding.’ Principles of
European Contract Law art 2:107; similarly, see Draft Common Frame of Reference for European Contract
Law, bk II, arts 1:103(2), 4:301-4:303. See also T B Smith, Pollicitatio—Promise and Offer, 1958 Acta
Juridica 141, reprinted in T B Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative (1962) 168 (henceforth Smith,
“Studies Critical”); T B Smith, “Unilateral Promise (Pollicitation)”, in A Short Commentary on the Law of
Scotland (1962) ch 32.
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Stair is the primary source, as may be seen from the notes below, but the Lord Lyon’s history of promise,
see Sellar (n 35), contains much of the information, and the complexity of the debate within the ius
commune comes through most clearly in MacQueen & Sellar (n 35) at 358-65.
66
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His next point is of keen interest to the current inquiry, for he introduces a
qualification akin to estoppel or bar: ‘But it is not every act of the will that raiseth an
obligation, or power of exaction . . . .’67 Instead, he distinguishes between ‘desire,
resolution, and engagement,’ and only the last of these gives rise to an obligation. This he
holds even if there be clear proof of a resolution ‘by word and writ,’ and cites a case to
this effect.68 So even a written resolution is not the same as a promise—a point that will
resonate in a case in 200769—and this holding raises two questions: first, what the
difference between a resolution and a promise is, and second, what happens if someone is
injured by this clear resolution. The second question is answered with an exception, as it
appears that Stair would find an obligation if ‘the resolution be holden forth to assure
others.’70 This, it would seem, is related to the notion of personal bar, although not so
termed, and it seems based essentially on the interests of the ‘others,’ as the resolution by
itself is insufficient, although Stair does not require any reliance, at least explicitly.
As far as I have been able to find, Stair answers the first question with a circular
definition,71 but that is not of primary interest here. The explanation of the promise
certainly is, however, not just because of the significance for promissory estoppel but
also because of the mixing. Stair states that ‘a promise is that which is simple and pure,
and hath not implied as a condition, the acceptance of another,’72 and he thus
distinguishes an obligation based on a promise from an obligation based on a contract,
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Ibid.
Ibid I.10.2 (citing 27 Feb 1673, Kincaid contra Dickson [2 Stair 181; M 12143]).
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which ‘is the deed of two, the offerer and the accepter.’73 This distinction draws on
roughly four categories of sources, depending on the categorization: natural law, canon
law, civil (Roman) law, and Scots law. Stair begins by considering and rejecting
Grotius’s requirement of acceptance.74 (I here categorize Grotius as a natural law treatise,
though it may certainly be considered otherwise.) Unaccepted promises, Stair asserts,
‘now are commonly held obligatory, the canon law having taken off the exception of the
civil law, de nudo pacto.’
Here can be observed the authority of the civil law (meaning Roman law), but as
updated and even superseded by canon law. The reference to canon law is not expounded,
but it comes up slightly later with respect to proof. Stair explains the position of Roman
rules of nudum pactum, but says, ‘We shall not insist in these, because the common
custom of nations hath resiled therefrom, following rather the canon law, by which every
paction produceth action, et omne verbum de ore fideli cadit in debitum.’75 The reliance
on canon law is explicit, although the precise reference is obscure to the present author.76
This choice may seem less surprising given that ecclesiastical courts maintained an
important role in Scotland even after the Reformation, and the Court of Session was itself
largely ecclesiastical in its conception, character, and outlook.77 Stair also cites the views
of Petrus Gudelinus and of Corvinus, and we here find a reference to ‘the common
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custom of nations,’ in Latin possibly rendered as ius gentium, although here probably
better denominated ius commune, meaning the post-antique custom of nations rather than
the ius gentium of the Roman law. To the beginnings of the law of nature, as represented
by Grotius, then, we find the law of ancient Rome, the law of the medieval Church, and
the custom of nations—meaning, notably, Continental nations.
As will be recalled, however, these sources were not all, for Stair also included
Scots practice, represented in the paragraph on promise by case law, and later, by what he
says is a statute. Three cases are marshalled to give the Scots law of promise. Further
research has shown that Stair was accurately representing the contemporary law in
Scotland, although the statute he had in mind is a bit vexing,78 and an examination of
Hope suggests that Stair did not fully explain that Scots law had not entirely gone down
the path of the canon law, at least when Hope was writing. Hope’s view, while
sympathetic to the canon law idea, says that the ‘comone law’ of Scotland differed from
the canon law.79 We might thus detect a bit of advocacy in Stair—assuming no
significant change in the ‘comone law’ between Hope and Stair—as Stair chooses his
main ingredients and selects carefully among the other ones, finding the choicest bits that
fit with his goals and rejecting other, less appealing bits. Also noticeably absent is the law
of England. However it is considered, then, the law propounded by Stair was a gourmand
mixture, drawing on sources crossing centuries and crossing the Continent (but not
dipping south into England), offering a wide but select list of ingredients.
Before leaving Stair, the problem of proof needs further exploration, and here the
case law is brought to bear. Promises, he says, cannot be proved by witnesses, even for
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small amounts—unlike contracts. He suggests an exception where the promises ‘are parts
of bargains about moveables,’ but the general rule is unyielding, and a writ would be
necessary. He justifies this on Roman law grounds: just as ‘the Roman law gave no action
upon naked pactions, to prevent the mistakes of parties and witnesses in communings,’
Scots law sought to prevent such mistakes, particularly since writing had become ‘so
ordinary,’ and those who failed to avail themselves of ‘so easy a method’ could not resort
to legal process. In such cases, the promise could be recognized only in the conscience of
the promisor—a formulation that evokes the imperfect obligation of the natural law
writers.80
Although the mixing can be observed in the seventeenth century, its importance in
modern law can be credited to the twentieth century work of T. B. Smith and what has
been called the ‘neo-Civilian revival’ that took place after the Second World War.81 Two
of Smith’s works served to bring the Scots law of unilateral promise, if not into the
forefront, at least out of obscurity. Part of his work has special import here because it
takes on the fusion or confusion of English and Scots law on promises and contracts,
particularly with respect to options and rewards.82 (I leave the stipulatio alteri to another
author in this volume.)83 Possibly the leading edge on which English law worked its way
into Scotland was the infectiously memorable and thus powerful case of Carlill v
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.84
With that case in mind, Smith demonstrated how the unwieldy English
requirements of offer and acceptance as well as consideration were brought into the Scots
80
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law of rewards and options.85 The result of Stair’s careful mixture, that is, the law of
unilateral promise, seemed slowly to have been smoothed away under the successive
waves of cases taking an English approach, attempting to fit promises into contracts with
acceptance and consideration.86 The Scots law certainly was not washed away in this
period, as the 1899 case of Morton’s Trustees v Aged Christian Friend Society87 shows,
but it was in rather a sorry state. Morton’s Trustees brought in the law of promise when
offer and acceptance was the accurate analysis for the facts,88 and it has been said that
there was also an element of rei interventus.89 Other cases approached the law of promise
more carefully.90 But the problems of the assimilation of Scots law in the early twentieth
century were clear, with confusing consequences on common fact patterns, involving
ideas like options or modifications.91
What Smith did was to illustrate the elegance of the Scottish (i.e., non-English)
solution and place it into a comparative context that gave it both pedigree and gravitas.
His work takes into account the great Civil Law families of French and German law and
particularly addresses Roman-Dutch law and South African law. He explains where
Stair’s—and Scotland’s—solution fits among those respectable traditions, and he
demonstrates the superior doctrinal simplicity of a Scottish analysis of the problems
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The terminology is troubling here, as many of the ‘reward’ cases are about undertakings by publishers
and their insurers to pay anyone—or his estate—if he should die in a railway accident while carrying a
particular newspaper or diary. Similarly, an ‘option’ sounds like it is short for an ‘option contract,’ but only
a price said to be good for a set period is meant. Writing in English brings in English connotations, yet
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1909 SC 344, 1909 SC (HL) 30.
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88
E.g. McBryde, Contracts (n 35) para 2-24.
89
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posed by the cases. This is work of mixture and comparison as well as scholarship and
advocacy, and judging from the following century, it seems to have been effective.
Perhaps the best way to appreciate Smith’s success is to look at the doctrine now.
Professor MacQueen followed Smith a generation or so later with a similar analysis,
noting an English case in which trustees had committed to accepting the highest bid92 and
showing again how Smith’s Scottish treatment of the smoke ball case, using the law of
unilateral promise, produced the right result with a simpler and more accurate legal
characterization of the facts.93 Admittedly the necessity of Professor MacQueen’s article
shows that Smith was not complete in his success; while several cases took the Scottish
road to enforcing options as unilateral obligations,94 some (notably Professor Walker)
seemed instead to follow ‘the approach of English law.’95 The echoes of Smith and the
smoke ball explanation continue, appearing still in Professor McBryde’s standard work.96
The reverberation evidences what may be unavoidable for a mixed jurisdiction like
Scotland or Louisiana: a distinctiveness in the smaller jurisdictions (Scotland and
Louisiana) that is defined by differing from the dominant jurisdiction (England and the
United States).
So Scotland came to have its doctrine of the unilateral promise. It was a simple
accomplishment in that it seems to owe everything to Stair, and his authority and his
clarity. But it was a complex concatenation that led to this simple result. Hope and Stair
provide conflicting perspectives on Scots law. Hope inclined toward the canon law, thus
92
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giving Scots law a stir. A bit later, Stair drew on natural law and canon law and civil
law—in short, the complex of the ius commune—and found a protection for a unilateral
promise. The unique flavour was diluted later, by further mixing and further imports from
English law, until Smith and his followers were able to write the doctrine that recited a
more purely Scottish—or more accurately, a less English—rule, and returned to Stair’s
fold.

(2)

Codification in Louisiana

Some of the most interesting mixing to be observed in Louisiana occurs a few centuries
after Stair, and the best view in this particular Louisiana cooking show is to be seen
through the lens of the Civil Code revision.97 This modern recipe seems more complex
than the Scottish version as the many chefs in the kitchen were aiming at a re-mix. The
Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute wanted to remove consideration from
Louisiana obligations law and also wanted to add promissory estoppel. This desire was
made explicit in so many words when the Council ‘instructed the reporter to draft an
article that would make it quite clear that “cause” is not “consideration” in the Common
Law sense, and, further, to introduce a concept analogous to “detrimental reliance” or
“promissory estoppel.”’98 The developments with respect to cause and consideration have
been summarized above, but here the introduction of promissory estoppel deserves
specific examination.
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The model for promissory estoppel, patently, was the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 90. The earliest available draft defines cause, distinguishes it from
consideration, and provides for promissory estoppel. The draft reproduces § 90 of the
Restatement below the proposed Code language, along with previous Code articles
defining cause. The Common Law doctrine of promissory estoppel was being grafted
onto the Code at the same time that consideration was being excised. The irony is doublefaced: not only are Common Law notions defining cause, positively and negatively, but
promissory estoppel is being imported at the same time that the chief doctrine that made
it necessary is being deported. If this were not enough, the reporter was further
‘instructed to make detrimental reliance compatible with cause.’ 99 This he endeavoured
to do by a bit of sleight of hand: instead of having cause be the ‘motive’ for making a
promise, as in article 1896 of the Code of 1870 (leaving out the troublesome mention of
consideration), one might say the cause is the reason for making the promise. Then one
might say that ‘[c]ause is the reason that makes an obligation enforceable.’
Hardly a significant change, it would seem at first, except that the sleight of hand
would turn cause around entirely. Cause began as the motive of the promisor. The cause
of a contract, then, may be illegal, in which case the promise would not be enforceable,
but the promise would still have a cause. In the proposed formulation, if the promise is
supported by cause, it is for that very reason enforceable, by definition. Cause has been
not only turned around, then, but made to serve the same function as consideration. To be
clear, it did not employ the same test as consideration—no bargain was to be required—
but the function of the doctrine was to be the same. At Common Law, if there is
consideration the promise is enforceable, and otherwise not. Under the proposed
99
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formulation, if there is cause, the promise is enforceable, and otherwise not. This
proposition is a far cry from the original scheme, and while Civilian in its adherence to a
cause not identical to bargain, it is being driven by concerns emanating from the
Common Law.
The mixing is also apparent in how the introduction of promissory estoppel is
justified. The arguments in favour of the doctrine are put three ways. Promissory
estoppel, the reporter says, is consonant with principles in the existing Code, including its
Napoleonic general article on delictual obligation: ‘Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.’100 He also
says that promissory estoppel has been recognized in the case law. This proposition was a
bit difficult in light of the Supreme Court of Louisiana decision in Ducote v Oden, as
mentioned above, but the reporter identified the undercurrent of cases that applied the
principle sub rosa both before and after Ducote.
Perhaps the most remarkable argument is the last: that promissory estoppel is in
essence a Civil Law doctrine anyway. It is likened to delictual and quasi-delictual
obligations in the Civil Law, and it is linked particularly to culpa in contrahendo, the
primarily German doctrine that provides a remedy against one whose fault in the
contracting process damages the other party.101 It is also linked to ‘the binding force of a
unilateral declaration of will,’102 the very same idea observed in Scotland, and most
clearly in Stair. The crowning glory, though, goes to the assertion that estoppel is
100
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descended from the Roman law doctrine of venire contra factum proprium.103 The
assertion that promissory estoppel is not a Common Law invention after all, and is
instead Roman and thus quintessentially of the Civil Law, is no less remarkable for its
dubiety. Venire contra factum proprium is more generally viewed as being based on facts
rather than executory promises, and is therefore closer to equitable estoppel (i.e., estoppel
in pais) rather than promissory estoppel. Moreover, venire factum proprium is probably
better attributed to the ius commune, and perhaps Bartolus originally, rather than Rome,
as earlier research has shown.104 But these are scholastic points. The impetus came from
the American Common Law and the Restatement. The revision draft reproduces section
90, not a text from the Digest or from Bartolus, neither of which is very clearly about
promissory estoppel anyway.
So we see mixing, and machinations, in three ways. First, the very fact that
promissory estoppel is being introduced shows a mixture, as the rule of the American
Common Law is taken from the Restatement and paraphrased into the Civil Code.
Second, the juxtaposition of Common Law and Civil Law thinking drove efforts
(ultimately unsuccessful) to define cause in a way that would have been consonant with
promissory estoppel and that would have made cause serve the same function as
consideration, albeit not requiring a bargain. Third, the attempt to justify promissory
estoppel as a doctrine of Civil Law, and even Roman law, shows the kind of Civilian
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striving that can be expected only when Common Law thinking seems uncomfortably—
even threateningly—close.

D.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL JOBS

Discussing and comparing doctrines in the abstract can lead to a disembodied logic, as
well as to errors born of finding cognate doctrines that sound similar but whose use is
different. One way to check that the doctrines under examination bear comparison is to
consider what jobs they do.105 The constraints of a micro-comparison and of space
prevent a thorough examination, but an overview is a helpful validating device.
Promissory estoppel in Louisiana, an earlier study suggested, worked in many of
the same sorts of jobs associated with promissory estoppel in the rest of the United
States,106 and this situation continues under current case law. Subcontractor bids led to
some of the classic cases of American promissory estoppel,107 and Louisiana has seen its
share of them too. These cases are usually about problems of option contracts,
irrevocable offers, and the like. The more general problem of so-called ‘precontractual’
liability can itself be a source for promissory estoppel claims, and again Louisiana has
seen its share, including disputes about options.108 The cases in Louisiana, as in the

105

I am indebted to Karl Llewellyn’s thinking about law-jobs. See generally K N Llewellyn, “The
Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs” 49 YaleLJ 1355 (1940).
106
The cases for the first dozen years of promissory estoppel in the Civil Code are collected and classified
in Snyder (n 4) at 734-47.
107
James Baird Co v Gimbel Bros 64 F2d 344 (2d Cir 1933); Drennan v Star Paving Co 333 P2d 757 (Cal
1958).
108
For cases involving alleged potential precontractual liability issues, see Suire v Lafayette City-Parish
Consol Govt, 907 So2d 37 (La 2005); Baker v LSU Health Scis Ctr, Inst of Professional Education 889
So2d 1178 (La Ct App 2004); Hibernia Nat’l Bank v Antonini 862 So2d 331 (La Ct App 2003) (loan case,
claimed promise of permanent funding); Holt v Bethany Land Co 843 So2d 606 (La Ct App 2003) (option
holder was using the land); Magic Moments Pizza, Inc v Louisiana Restaurant Assn 819 So2d 1146 (La Ct
App 2002) (insurance coverage through detrimental reliance); Haring v Stinson 756 So2d 1201 (La Ct App
2000). See also Gangi Seafood, Inc v ADT Security Services 2005 US App LEXIS 4 (5th Cir 2005) (alarm
service); Rogers v Brooks, 122 Fed Appx 729 (5th Cir 2004); Becnel v Whirley Indus 2003 US Dist LEXIS

SNYDER

HUNTING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

38

United States more widely, often revolve around claims that insurers have granted
insurance in some provisional but binding way (at least temporarily), or that a lender has
committed to making a loan. The reporters are filled with such cases, and again Louisiana
has been no exception, at least until recently. There have now been legislative efforts to
quash this effect in Louisiana,109 and since the Louisiana Supreme Court has made clear
that it will broadly and strictly enforce this special statute of frauds for credit
agreements,110 the loan cases may dissipate. One prominent job for promissory estoppel
would thus be eliminated, but it is nevertheless a limited exception.
In addition, promissory estoppel claims are sometimes asserted instead of contract
claims. When this phenomenon was perceived it excited much scholarly comment in the
United States as it seemed to bolster the earlier claim that contract was dead: not only
because promissory estoppel had killed consideration, but because promissory estoppel
was a more viable general cause of action than the technically constrained contract
action. For some time this scholarship was so generally accepted that it was referred to as
the ‘new consensus’ on promissory estoppel. Further studies, however, have shown that
these effects appeared exaggerated, primarily because promissory estoppel claims rarely

21575 (D La 2003) (precontractual liability and confidentiality); Starco Meats, Inc v Bryan Foods, Inc
2003 US Dist LEXIS 4452 (D La 2003); Jobe v ATR Mktg, Inc 1998 US Dist LEXIS 18171 (D La 1998)
(option). Cases involving problems of agency or mandate might also be put in this category, or perhaps
they deserve a classification of their own. On these issues, see Freeman Decorating Co v Encuentro Las
Americas Trade Corp 2005 US Dist LEXIS 18313 (D La 2005); Dan Rhodes Enters v City of Lake
Charles, 857 So2d 1256 (La Ct App 2003).
109
Since 1989, credit agreements must be stated in signed writings. La Rev Stat Ann § 6:1122, per 1989
La. Acts no. 531, § 1. Although not relevant to the point in the text, surely it must be remarked that the new
statute requires a written expression of ‘consideration’!
110
Jesco Constr Corp v Nationsbank Corp 830 So2d 989 at 992 (La 2002) (holding that the writing
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win. More than one study has now found that the courts are generally unsympathetic to
promissory estoppel, and that contract is a considerably firmer ground for recovery.111
Again, Louisiana is susceptible of similar descriptions. A number of cases
asserting promissory estoppel claims could be put into the ‘completed contract’ category,
and this gives rise to the idea that promissory estoppel is supplanting contract, or other
more specific rules. Sometimes, indeed, this observation is accurate,112 and sometimes a
detrimental reliance claim can even seem to displace or at least supplement a contract.113
Because the courts can be so stringent in their approach to promissory estoppel, though,
such claims often fail. For this primary reason the later studies have found contract very
much alive, promissory estoppel being the kind of last resort it was designed to be, and
some Louisiana cases suggest this mindset.114 While there are certainly cases that bring
promissory estoppel into the realm of completed synallagmatic contracts,115 and thus may
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App 2002) (court in the end uses public records doctrine rather than detrimental reliance).
115
See Shreveport Plaza, LLC v Dollar Tree Stores, Inc 196 Fed Appx 320 (5th Cir 2006), in addition to
the cases cited above (n 113).

SNYDER

HUNTING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

40

be seen to undermine the law of contract, there are also cases that hold that where there is
a synallagmatic contract, that contract provides the rights of the parties rather than
alleged promises and detrimental reliance.116 Along the same lines, courts seem unlikely
to find reasonable reliance when the alleged promisor has not made a promise that rises
to the level ordinarily associated with a contract or guarantee.117
In the completed bargain cases, sometimes a lack of formalities is the cause for
the move into promissory estoppel. At first the Louisiana courts appeared reluctant, and
they seemed poised to join the states that resisted the general rule, encapsulated in the
special section of the Restatement (§ 139, as opposed to the usual § 90), that promissory
estoppel could defeat a defence under the statute of frauds. More recent Louisiana cases
point in the other direction, however, and several have followed (or indicated that they
would follow in appropriate circumstances) the general rule that promissory estoppel
under article 1967 can trump a writing requirement. The strength of these holdings is
uncertain, however, as the cases I have found all arose in securities transactions;118 while
there had been an applicable writing requirement at the time that the operative events
occurred, the writing requirement had been abolished by the time that the cases were
decided. (As an aside, I cannot help but note that the statute of frauds involved came from
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which was revised effective 1996.119
Louisiana has adopted much of the UCC, which is itself a sign of mixture, and the
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bringing together of promissory estoppel, from the Restatement via the Civil Code, to the
statute of frauds requirement, and its later abolition, through work of a nationwide
uniform law process, is testament to the mixing that continues to occur.) The strict
enforcement of the new writing requirements for loan agreements should also be
recalled.120
The main qualification when Louisiana is compared to the American Common
Law is the area of family promises and gifts. These cases arguably gave rise to the
doctrine in the first place, but Louisiana refused to follow. Here, after all, Louisiana has
retained its Civil Law authentic act as a way of making an enforceable promise to make a
gift—a legal device that the American Common Law lost when the seal fell into
desuetude. Nevertheless, this part of the legal field has proved a fertile breeding ground
for promissory estoppel claims in Louisiana, although they have been unsuccessful.121
Just as article 1967 has taken on the promissory estoppel jobs in Louisiana, the
Scottish authorities suggest that a combination of the doctrines of promise and bar serves
the same functions in Scotland. Since Smith, Professor MacQueen has probably done as
much as anyone to promote the use of promise, and he has suggested several jobs for it.
Following Smith, of course, he suggests its use in reward cases. More practically, he has
suggested its employment in gratuitous promises, both with families or charities and with
commercial promises. He has in mind a variety of commercial transactions that would fit
well within the scheme of promissory estoppel jobs set out above. With respect to the
gratuitous commercial promises, for example, he suggests a hypothetical (reminiscent of
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A. & G. Paterson v Highland Railway,122 about which Smith had also written) in which a
lessor agrees to lower the rent but only during the time the tenant is experiencing
financial difficulties. The hypothetical also echoes some of the estoppel-based contract
readjustments that I have classified in the ‘completed bargain’ category of Louisiana
cases.123
Of course much of the use of the doctrine is suggested with irrevocable offers and
options,124 particularly where advertising is involved (e.g., ‘lowest tender accepted’ or
‘first offer over £Y secures’).125 More broadly, in this category of precontractual liability,
MacQueen discusses a variety of cases that would fit well with the Louisiana case law.
He notes the problems that tend to arise in large construction contracts, particularly when
public bidding, final negotiation, and subcontract arrangement are involved. Frequently
‘letters of intent’ are used in this context in the United Kingdom, and while that is not the
typical practice in the United States as far as I know, the problems generated by the
complex undertakings and the need for preparation before the general contract is final is
the perfect ground for the use of promise.126 Scottish law, as Professor MacQueen sees it
at least, and Louisiana law would appear to have a close fit in this regard. In the
postcontractual context, guarantees made after the buyer has purchased the goods might
best be analyzed under a promissory rubric.127
On the other hand, there are two transactions suggested by Professor MacQueen
that do not fit with Louisiana cases. One is the potential role of promise in explaining the
122
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enforceability of bankers’ letters of credit and the like. The Scots law of promise has been
suggested as an appropriate avenue for the analysis of these undertakings, which are often
unaccepted and whose enforceability has presented a doctrinal difficulty,128 if not a
practical one (as there are no Scottish cases on the issue). In the United States these
issues have been governed by statute for about fifty years, since Article 5 of the Uniform
Commercial Code came into widespread use. Louisiana has adopted Article 5, evidence
again of mixing in the contractual and commercial law of Louisiana, and thus the
enforceability of letters of credit is not a question. To the extent other questions arise
about similar instruments, Louisiana also has enacted Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC on
negotiable instruments and bank deposits, and again enforceability does not raise
troubling issues. Professor MacQueen’s other suggestion that does not fit with Louisiana
(and American) promissory estoppel jobs is the analysis of requirements contracts. But
Professor MacQueen does not press this suggestion with great vigour.129
Other commercial contexts have proved ripe for analysis along the lines of
promise. The facts of Krupp Uhde GmbH v Weir Westgarth Ltd.130 suggest one: large
contracts often necessitate not only readjustments between the parties, requiring the kind
of modifications already mentioned, but also adjustments with others. Once the fact of
lending is brought into the analysis the possibilities become obvious, as one of the parties
may need to obtain additional financing or may wish to refinance. Because of the
demands of that party’s lender, relatively minor but crucial readjustments may be needed,
as with payment instructions: a subcontractor’s lender may well insist that the general
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contractor pay the lender directly instead of relying on the subcontractor to receive
payment and then forward the money to the lender in repayment of the loan. Although the
matter may appear technical, a binding undertaking from the general contractor to pay the
lender directly can make the lender considerably more secure, and the failure of the
general contractor to comply with its undertaking could be the difference between the
lender being repaid in the millions or instead getting nothing at all.
The law of promise can work here, as was suggested by counsel in the case,
although the court eventually decided that assignation of the payment right was a better
interpretation of the transaction. In that case, I would suggest, Lord Eassie was wise for
several reasons, not all of which are discussed in the opinion. The real question was
whether the lender was entitled to full payment or instead only the payment due to the
subcontractor after deductions were made because of problems in the subcontractor’s
performance. Although the issue was discussed thoroughly, Lord Eassie did not seem to
suffer much doubt about the real issue: of course the lender would only get what the
subcontractor itself was entitled to receive. The more interesting point here is the legal
device Lord Eassie chose.
It would have been perfectly feasible to find a promise, but to interpret the
promise as a commitment to pay the lender only that which was due the subcontractor.
Assignation of what payment right the subcontractor had, however, not only achieves the
same result but could have the added benefit of giving the lender the better security that it
seemed to want. A mere promise to pay L what is due to S arguably keeps the payment
right in S, while an assignation of S’s payment right to L may shift the property in the
payment right from S to L. In that case, should S go bankrupt—the very possibility this
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arrangement contemplates—L will have better grounds to argue that the payment should
still be made to L and is not a right that is part of S’s bankruptcy estate, to be split among
creditors. The parties might thus achieve their undoubted goal of bankruptcy remoteness.
Krupp Uhde, then, is something of a parable about the law of promise: the doctrine is
potentially so broad that it might be used beyond the bailiwick in which it works best.
Other commercial contexts, however, would be better suited to promise. In
American commercial practice, for example, the work (usually called ‘due diligence’)
before a merger often requires the parties to obtain consent from the contractual partners
of the merging parties, assuring that the merged entities will have the benefit of those preexisting contracts. The lawyers set about obtaining what are called ‘estoppel letters’ from
all of the key contracting partners, who promise in those letters not to object to the
merger, and who perhaps consent to the assignment of the contract. If relied on, these
letters can give rise to promissory estoppel, and lawyers treat them as enforceable.
Estoppel, however, requires reliance, which could be difficult to prove to a court with a
sceptical view (a frequent occurrence, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter). Would the
parties really have foregone the merger in the absence of the estoppel letter? Often it may
be shown that the merger went forward without letters from some contracting parties.
Were this situation to arise in Louisiana, as it certainly does, the position if the matter
were to go to litigation would be far from certain given the lack of demonstrable reliance.
The Scots law of promise offers a considerably better analysis.
So far the exploration of jobs in Scots law has focused on the law of promise, but
personal bar or its allied doctrines is also crucial. For centuries gratuitous promises had to
be proved by writ or oath, and as has been seen, formal requirements often lead to a
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need—or desire—for an exception along the lines of promissory estoppel. Since 1995,
the matter has become clearer (which is not to say clear) under the Requirement of
Writing (Scotland) Act. The need for writ or oath is outright abolished for business
promises, even though they may be gratuitous. The Law Revision Commission thought
business promises, though possibly gratuitous, were likely to be ‘very far from being rash
or impulsive gestures,’131 and Professor MacQueen, perhaps the principal proponent of
the business exception, suggests that there ought not to be ‘formal impediments to
commercial activity.’132 As a business promise might be found in many contexts, as with
payments involved in home improvements,133 this exception may prove wide-ranging.
And a reliance based exception is generally available, as discussed above, for other
promises. It would seem, then, at least in theory, that the laws of promise and bar do the
promissory estoppel jobs in Scotland, with some qualifications, in much the same way
that article 1967 works in Louisiana.
The case law in Scotland is considerably thinner than in Louisiana, but the cases I
have found in the last fifty years (with occasional reference to the older cases) suggest
that promise and bar are doing promissory estoppel jobs similar to those in Louisiana.
Many fall into the category I have called the cusp of contract (preferring that phrase to
the more precise but less accurate ‘precontractual’ liability). The relatively recent case of
J. W. Soils (Suppliers) Ltd v Corbett134 involves an alleged promise to pay for expenses
incurred as the parties considered a real estate development that would turn Rowallan
131
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Castle into a hotel and leisure centre. Stone v Macdonald135 is about an option problem,
and although it may be a contract case rather than a case of promise (there is some
conflict here),136 it was at least founded on a case of promise.137 Other option cases
include Miller Homes Ltd v Frame138 and a sheriff court case in which the promised
option had prescribed.139 Mason v A. & R. Robertson & Black involves efforts to close a
sale where the contract was already agreed by missives; in that case, the alleged promise
came from a third party, the solicitor, who undertook to take care of the transaction
should the parties go forward.140 But while the cases and arguments can be found, the
courts are notoriously careful about finding a promise too easily.141 If the parties
contemplate a transaction like a sale, which involves bilateral rather than unilateral
obligation, the courts generally expect to see offer and acceptance and are unlikely to find
a unilateral promise.142
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Similarly, most of the relevant cases of statutory bar fall into the ‘cusp of
contract’ category, reflecting deals that are partially but not wholly completed. Advice
Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll involves a lease in which the parties had agreed to
possession, term, and rent, and the tenants allegedly even moved in, paid rent, and
improved the property. The court found that the parties regarded a purchase option as
significant, however, and since they had failed to reach agreement on that point, there
was no agreement that could give rise to bar.143 With respect to the parties’ failure to
comply with the necessary formalities—the promissory estoppel exception to the statute
of frauds, in American terms—the court cast an unsympathetic eye. ‘If parties do not
adhere to the very simple requirements [of writing] that are now prescribed, they have
only themselves to blame.’144 Another cusp-of-contract case, Park Lane Developments
(Glasgow Harbour) Ltd. v Jesner involved an alleged agreement about conveying a
parking place. The buyer seemed to think he was getting a conveyance outright, but the
developer offered only undivided common ownership, which the buyer (after
considerable delay) rejected. A further recent case was, like so many of the promise
cases, about an option.145 All of these cases suggest that arguments about statutory bar are
being pressed—not necessarily successfully—in much the same context in Scotland as in
Louisiana.
In the completed contract category, a distinction between the Scottish and
Louisiana law should be noted. In Louisiana, because of concern about the reliability and
therefore the primacy of the contract, some courts have turned away promissory estoppel
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claims. This holding is made possible by the reliance element of promissory estoppel in
Louisiana; a court can well hold that relying on promises not contained in the contract (or
in a contract, as in Miller v Loyola University) is unreasonable. In Scots law, as a promise
is a unilateral obligation requiring no reliance, this reasoning is not possible. Rather,
counsel may argue that a promise has been made entirely outside the contract, and if the
wording is sufficiently clear, a court should accept the argument. This point appears not
only in Krupp Uhde but also in the quite similar case of Ballast Plc v Laurieston
Properties Ltd.,146 as well as other authorities. 147 On the other hand, as Lady Paton holds
in Ballast, the proof of the promise needs to be quite clear. The courts will be ‘looking
for a commercially sensible construction’ and will want some explanation as to why a
reasonable person would think that a legally binding guarantee (as had been argued) had
been made through, as in that case, a letter about a mechanism of payment.148 In this
category of cases, therefore, we find Louisiana and Scottish courts exercised by similar
concerns, and reaching similar results, although on somewhat different grounds.
Aside from these relatively fertile areas, cases can be found elsewhere. The
classic category of family promises, though often unsuccessful, can still come in for
treatment akin to promissory estoppel under the Scots doctrine of promise.149 Not all
cases can be so neatly lined up into typical categories, however. Bathgate v Rosie150
perhaps does not fit any category well; it involves seemingly quotidian facts that do not
often make their way into the case law. A mother promised to pay for a window her son
146
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had broken, and the law held her to her promise. One might be tempted to classify this
promise as founded on a natural or moral obligation, which seems accurate enough, but it
should be noted that a natural or moral obligation does not itself constitute the necessary
promise.151 In any case, as a residual doctrine promissory estoppel and its cognates
always have a variety of odd cases to settle.152 Lord Advocate v City of Glasgow DC may
also fall into this residuum.153 Other cases involving public authorities, which may
involve an indeterminate creditor or in any event a lack of a formal acceptance, might
prove amenable to analysis as promise cases. This possibility is suggested by the Muckle
Flugga Lighthouse Case, although the court there holds that the Commissioners of
Northern Lighthouses are the creditors of a contractual obligation.154
Doubtless many cases, especially Scottish ones, have not been noticed here. Still,
by Louisiana standards the Scottish case law, particularly on promise, seems almost
vanishingly thin—even though the time under examination is doubled. I have
concentrated on cases in Louisiana since article 1967 became effective in 1985, focusing
in this particular paper primarily on cases from the past dozen years, when my earlier
study was published. In Scotland I have looked for cases from the last fifty years or so. In
the last dozen years there have been roughly fifty or sixty cases on promissory estoppel in
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Louisiana. The entry on promise in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (1996) cites only
two cases from the last fifty years155 (with no supplemental entry), and Gloag (11th ed.
2001) another one.156 I have found more for this paper, relying partly on McBryde (3d ed.
2007) and some more general research, but the results have not been great, as can be seen
above. Professor MacQueen has pointed out that the concept of unilateral promise is
‘little utilised.’157 On the side of statutory bar, the story is not much different; Elspeth
Reid has observed ‘surprisingly little litigation.’158 The implication is not necessarily that
the doctrine per se is different or differently used, as larger differences in litigation
patterns may provide a better explanation. But it is certainly remarkable.
On this note a related point should be made. In the cases that there are, the courts
are sceptical bordering on stingy on both sides of the Atlantic. The judges enforce the
legal requirements in many cases stringently, one might even say with a vengeance. The
facts of Advice Centre for Mortgages have already been mentioned, but the cases could
be multiplied. Reliance must be clear, and if it is as referable to one state of affairs as
another, the statutory element for bar is not met.159 Even when the reliance is clear, it
needs to be ‘reasonable’ under the statute, but the judicial view of reason seems to
demand impeccable attention to detail. In Ben Cleuch Estates Ltd. v Scottish
Enterprise,160 the tenant held an option from the lessor, Ben Cleuch Estates Ltd. Various
invoices, correspondence, and emails, however, came from Bonnytoun Estates Ltd, a
subsidiary of Ben Cleuch, and the tenant sent its notice of exercise of the option to

155

Bathgate v Rosie 1976 SLT (Sh Ct) 16.
Hunter v Bradford Property Trust 1970 SLT 173.
157
MacQueen & Thomson, Contracts (n 35) para 2.61.
158
E Reid “Personal Bar: Three Cases” (2006) 10 EdinLR 437 at 437.
159
Tom Super Printing Supplies Ltd v South Lanarkshire Council 1999 GWD 31-1496.
160
[2006] CSOH 35.
156

SNYDER

HUNTING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

52

Bonnytoun. The court found the tenant’s reliance on the invoices, correspondence, and
emails unreasonable, holding that the tenant’s solicitor ought to have checked more
carefully on a lease with an annual rent of over £200,000. ‘[A]s so often, the plea of bar
ended in failure.’161
Similar concerns are apparent in the Louisiana case law. Some courts, at least,
carefully enforce the requirements of a promise and reasonable, detrimental reliance on it.
For that reason, many of the Louisiana cases deny recovery based on promissory
estoppel. This paper is not the place for a careful assessment of the numerous Louisiana
cases, but the trend of probing judicial scrutiny of promissory estoppel claims is clear
enough.162 Perhaps nowhere is this trend as clear as in the at-will employment cases. An
employee at will cannot reasonably rely on a different state of affairs, it seems, almost no
matter what—absent an old-fashioned contract.163 This trend, observed in both Louisiana
and Scotland, appears consistent with the studies of promissory estoppel more generally
in the United States.164 While employment claims have met with particular hostility from
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the bench, the courts seem keen more generally to assure that promissory estoppel
remains in its secondary status, safely behind contract.
Even aside from reliance issues, which after all are not relevant in the Scots law
of promise, the attitude is the same. Possibly the best illustration of this attitude is the
very recent but unbelievably picturesque case of Countess of Cawdor v Earl of
Cawdor.165 Apparently there has been a long-running dispute between the dowager
countess and her step-son the earl and thane.166 At issue in this case were some pensionfund transfers arranged by the trustees with respect to the countess and her husband, the
late earl. The pension trustees said at a meeting that they planned to effect the transfers.
The earl then died, and the trustees and the dowager countess with the apparent consent
and help of the new earl completed some but not all of the transfers. The court had to
decide what would happen with the other contemplated transfers, and the countess
claimed that the trustees had promised to effect all of them. The meeting had been
formal, the trustees had taken legal and financial advice, and a written minute was duly
entered and signed.
Nevertheless, Lord President Hamilton quoted Stair’s careful distinctions with
respect to unilateral promises. Neither desire nor resolution is enough to constitute an
obligation, the Lord President observed, but some greater exercise of the will is required:
a promise. A legally binding promise was certainly possible, as counsel suggested, based
on the leading case of Macfarlane v Johnston.167 But Lord President Hamilton’s reading
of the minute did not suggest this level of commitment by the trustees, ‘but rather an
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intention, in the light of the advice received, to make in due course a transfer.’ This
intention was a plan but not a promise.168 The courts exercise great care before they
construe people into legally binding obligations, whether they be trustees resolved to
transfer significant monies or a simple doctor with a desire to reassure a patient.169

E.

THEORETICAL DEDUCTIONS
(1)

The Nature of Liability

Putting together Scottish and Louisiana law has thrown a few points into relief, not all of
which could be mentioned above. The most prominent is how the theoretical
underpinning of promissory liability differs between the systems, based largely on the
history and source of the doctrine, and possibly (tenuously?) on the moral commitments
of the legal systems. Scots law, it will be recalled, largely has drawn its law of promise
from Stair, who in turn drew on canon law and (less clearly) the Scottish common law
and the ius commune, to the exclusion of civil law. Although Stair disclaimed the notion
that every act of will could give rise to an obligation, he still came down firmly with the
thinkers who grounded liability on consent or will. That was his ground, and not the more
delictual notion of reliance. This theoretical basis is delineated unusually clearly because
not even acceptance is required, much less reliance. Of course on the personal bar side
the tort notions are more prevalent, and Stair’s treatment of promise already recognized
this idea by noticing that there could be liability even in the absence of a promise if a
resolution (as opposed to a promise) ‘be holden forth to assure others.’170 But this
exception takes little from the main point, for with a robust law of promise there is little
168
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need for promissory estoppel or personal bar,171 except in cases where a lack of
formalities or some other defect gets in the way.
The Louisiana side is weighted in the other direction. Certainly the promise is
crucial, and the obligation may therefore be said to be based on consent and the
individual will. Indeed, the early draft legislation recognizes that a basis for introducing
promissory estoppel into the Civil Code is that the move would appropriately validate
‘the binding force of a unilateral declaration of will.’172 And the prominence of promise
as the basis for liability has led to formal characterization of the liability as contractual
rather than delictual. The placement of the key provision in the Civil Code articles on
contracts in general, and even in the article on cause in particular, shows this choice, and
the courts have generally followed this formal allocation.173
Despite all of this, though, the Louisiana law seems decidedly delictual in
comparison to the Scottish law of promise. The doctrine, generally called ‘detrimental
reliance’ in Louisiana, is all about the promisee’s reliance. Although the early draft
legislative document mentioned the importance of the (promisor’s) will, delictual ideas
were the chief justification for the introduction of promissory estoppel.174 Louisiana, after
all, took its law not from the lawyers of the Church, concerned for the soul of the
promisor, but from the Restatement of the American Common Law, concerned with
equities that had to be recognized when the requirement of consideration or the
disappearance of the seal visited injustice on relying promisees. Given the equitable
nature of these concerns, to protect against the harm done to the promisee, the reliance is
171

McBryde, Contracts (n 35) para 2-02.
Apr 1979 Draft (n 98) at 6-7.
173
Stokes v Georgia-Pacific Corp 894 F2d 764 at 770 (5th Cir 1990); Flynn v Nesbitt 771 FSupp 766 at
768 (E D La 1991).
174
Apr 1979 Draft (n 98) at 7.
172

SNYDER

HUNTING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

56

required every bit as much as the promise, and the reliance must be reasonable and
detrimental. The courts have shown themselves quite willing to enforce these
requirements, and while it can hardly be said that the liability is exclusively delictual, it is
hardly based on consent alone. The element of tort in Louisiana law is quite strong in
comparative terms.

(2)

Formalities and Their Functions

Interestingly, Scotland and Louisiana made similar moves at roughly the same time,
between 1985 and the early 2000s. Scotland during that period moved away from its
requirement of a writ or oath for a promise, a requirement that did not admit an exception
even if there was detrimental reliance. At the same time the Louisiana Civil Code and the
case law interpreting it recognized a reliance based exception to some formal
requirements, although not all of them. Too much can be made of similar moves at
similar times, and cries of convergence are sometimes too swiftly voiced. The fact of the
moves and their timing, though, should at least be recorded, and some of the implications
considered.
When admitting some device to circumvent formal or other requirements for
promises, the courts in Louisiana and Scotland have shown great care, as those
requirements are typically thought to serve some important function. Typically American
thought, following Lon Fuller, turns to evidentiary, cautionary, and signalling or
channelling functions.175 Stair expresses the same idea, although without breaking it
down into particular functions aside from the avoidance of mistakes.176
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Let us begin with the evidentiary function. Writing serves as clear evidence of
what was said, and whether it was indeed a promise. It is not obvious whether Stair (or
the Scottish courts) recognize as much, but reliance can do the same, albeit less clearly.
Reliance is probative to a degree, as substantial reliance seems less likely in the absence
of some commitment. The reliance becomes quite probative if it occurs with the
knowledge, and perhaps even cooperation, of the promisor.
The ‘cautionary’ (in the American sense, having nothing to do with suretyship)
and signalling or channelling functions are related, but significantly different. A writing
and a fortiori an authentic act before a notary and witnesses should focus the attention of
the promisor, assuring that he makes a commitment only after acting with appropriate
deliberation. The Scottish Law Commission was certainly sensitive to this point,177 and it
is recognized (although not by that name) in current case law.178 In addition, a writing or
authentic act demarcates the promise as a legally binding one, not only cautioning the
promisor but signalling to the world in general, and the courts more particularly, that the
promisor intended to enter into the channel of legally binding relations, rather than the
typical informal and unenforceable channel where human relationships are governed
without the intervention of legal compulsion.
In some ways each of these functions can be seen as protecting promisors.
Promisors are thus prevented from acting too hastily and inconsiderately, and they are
protected from misconstruction of their words and actions. Their position with respect to
legal relationships is clarified. But some of these functions can be otherwise served, and a
177
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recognition of that fact can aid the promisee. A court might hold, for instance, that where
there is enough reliance by the promisee with the knowledge and cooperation of the
promisor, then the promisor has received all of the protection it needs. If the promisor let
a tenant enter the premises, accepted rent, and acquiesced in changes to the property, one
might think that the landlord knew what it was doing and was willing for there to be legal
effects.179 Finding the function of the required formality (writing) to be satisfied in such a
case by this kind of reliance, the court might hold for the tenant. The Scottish courts,
however, have seemed hesitant.
The case law thus indicates that Scottish courts may be particularly concerned
with signalling or channelling functions, which protect the parties, the courts, and society
in general. If we read the stinginess of the case law to require a clear demarcation
between friendly and even cooperative relations and legal ones, the cases make better
sense. Although the landlord admitted the tenant, the parties were not yet ready to be
bound. A writing is simple enough, and ‘ordinary,’180 hardly unusual in an age of forms
and general literacy. Friendly banter between friends on their way out for an evening of
bingo should not be turned into a contractual relationship about the splitting of winnings
unless the court examines the circumstances with great care.181 Even trustees in a formal
meeting may announce and record their intentions, and carry some of them out, without
being held committed to all of them.182

179

The discussion is based on Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll [2006] CSOH 58, 2006 SLT 591
per Lord Drummond Young.
180
Stair himself! Inst I.10.4.
181
The general rule and the possibility of exception based on considerable testimonial proof is shown in
Robertson v Anderson, admittedly a contract case, but showing the same concerns. 2003 SLT 235 (IH 5
Dec 2002).
182
Countess of Cawdor v Earl of Cawdor 2007 CSIH 3 (10 Jan 2007) per Hamilton LP.
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A commitment, then, may be possible, but its clarity, it seems, needs to be
unmistakable. Perhaps this is saying no more than Erskine said in the eighteenth
century,183 but that the dictum remains as important now as then is remarkable. If it is
true that omne verbum de ore fideli cadit in debitum,184 then the verbum must be ever so
clear, and fideli must carry a heavy and manifold meaning. It seems that Stair more aptly
described the landscape, in Louisiana as well as Scotland, with his own words: ‘But it is
not every act of the will that raiseth an obligation.’185

(3)

Doctrines with Elbows in a Jostling World

The Scots law of promise, augmented by the law of personal and statutory bar, raises
again a question in Louisiana that arose during the revision of the Code. Does Louisiana
need promissory estoppel? The answer at the time was that Louisiana had sufficient
doctrine to take care of promissory estoppel jobs, but that promissory estoppel would
provide a more direct approach to the typical problems.186 It might be added that
promissory estoppel might be a more approachable doctrine, the mix in Louisiana being
such that the Restatement is in far easier reach than sources on venire contra factum
proprium or culpa in contrahendo. This would seem particularly true for adjustments in
commercial relationships that are certainly not donative but that also are not easily
classified as onerous or synallagmatic contracts (e.g., undertakings to pay a
counterparty’s financier instead of the counterparty itself, as in Boyte or Krupp Uhde).187
183

III.3.90, cited in Hogg & MacQueen (n 53) at 2, 6.
Stair so recites the canon law, which he adopts. Inst I.10.7 (citing C.1 & 3 de pactis [C.2, 3, 1 and 3]).
185
Ibid I.10.1; see also Saúl Litvinoff “Still Another Look at Cause” (1987) 48 LaLRev 3 at 4 (‘In spite of
emphatic declarations . . . the fact is that consent alone is not enough to engender legal binding force.’).
186
Apr 1979 Draft (n 98) at 7.
187
Boyte v Wooten, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 45098, at *12-*16 (D La 2006); Krupp Uhde GmbH v Weir
Westgarth Ltd per Lord Eassie 31 May 2002 (OH).
184
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Promissory estoppel has elbows, and it elbowed its way into Louisiana. Perhaps fear
about those elbows is what has caused the courts to keep the doctrine in careful check.
The doctrine may thrust its elbows in other directions. Promissory estoppel in
Louisiana may stifle innovation in recognizing the efficacy of declarations of the will that
could be enforceable without reliance. The same idea carries greater weight in Scotland,
but in the other direction. Recognition of a legally enforceable promise, with the
relatively permissive requirement of a simple writing (as opposed to a deed), seemingly
slowed the development of reliance-based exceptions. They were not recognized until
1995, and the courts still seem reluctant to put them into play.
Perhaps it is not strictly relevant here, but this result seems too bad. Care about
putting a party into a legally binding relationship is understandable. A promisor ought to
be cautioned, and the courts ought to have good evidence, and the line between the
merely social and the coercively legal should be brightly marked. But these statements
are ideal, and justice involves balance. The law might intervene into a person’s natural
liberty not only because of consent but also because of harm to another. Certainly the
case for legal interference is stronger when there is both consent by the defendant and
harm to the plaintiff, as suggested, at least, by Fuller and Perdue’s construction of
Aristotle.188 Accordingly, justice may be served if there is heavy reliance, with the
foresight, and perhaps even knowledge and cooperation, of the promisor, even if the
promise is not stated in ideal terms.
188

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1132a-1132b, construed in L L Fuller & W R Perdue Jr “The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages” part 1 (1936) 46 YaleLJ 52 at 56-57. I here assume that Aristotle’s point, as
understood and expounded by Fuller and Perdue, is sound. Although unraveling its implications may lead
to questions and doubts, I do not treat them here. Cf. J Gordley, “Enforcing Promises” (1995) 83 CalLRev
547, and more fully, J Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991), and more
generally still, J Gordley, The Foundations of Private Law (2006). Compare McBryde (n 1) at 55 (on
Molina), 66 (on St Thomas Aquinas).
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CONCLUSION

The mixed nature of the law in Scotland and Louisiana has proved fertile for comparison.
The usual stories become more intricate as they involve elements from different places,
with complicated histories and traditions and languages. At the same time, the sensible
concerns of courts applying different but analogous doctrines can be observed, across
jurisdictional boundaries and even across seas. Pervading the complex learning and
borrowing are similar notions of justice and congruent policies oriented around
practicality. When deciding at what point, in the absence of an ordinary contract, persons
have bound themselves to each other, these sorts of concerns ring especially clearly. This,
I hope, is what we have been able to hear as we have hunted for promissory estoppel in
places where it is rather an exotic beast.
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